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Invited commentary: assessment or attribution of consciousness?

Tobias Schlicht

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103671 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that we are not epistemically justified in judging whether the neurobiological details of computational mechanisms are relevant to consciousness, because it is unclear how the medium independence of neural computation required by Computational Functionalism could be established, and also unclear whether predictive processing depends on life-sustaining biological processes and whether consciousness is medium dependent.

Abstract

Abstract I argue that we are not epistemically justified to judge whether the neurobiological details of computational mechanisms are relevant to consciousness or not. It is unclear how the medium independence of neural computation required for Computational Functionalism could be established. But it is also unclear whether predictive processing depends on life-sustaining biological processes and whether consciousness is medium dependent.

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