The neurobiophysical substrate of consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103749 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that creature consciousness depends on specific neurobiophysical properties that are not medium flexible, and therefore computational functionalism fails. Proposes that one of three alternatives holds: biological naturalism, a nonbiological yet noncomputational functionalism, or a view requiring specific macro-physical qualities. |
Abstract
Abstract I argue that creature consciousness depends on specific neurobiophysical properties that constitute the medium for phenomenally conscious states. Such properties are not medium flexible in the way required by computational functionalism. Therefore, computational functionalism fails, and one of the following holds: biological naturalism, a nonbiological yet noncomputational version of functionalism, or a view according to which consciousness requires specific (macro)physical qualities.