Cycling Conditions – Conditionalism About the Mind and Deguchi’s We-Turn
Markus Gabriel
Open Philosophy 2025 DOI: 10.1515/opphil-2025-0094 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that reconstructing Yasuo Deguchi's We-Turn framework through conditionalism, which treats events as wholes of interconnected necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, dissolves traditional mind-body problems by treating mental activity as an integrated whole of co-constitutive mental and non-mental elements. Proposes that the We-Turn reconceives subjectivity without a metaphysically isolated or self-positing individual and offers resources for philosophy of mind, social ontology, and epistemology. |
Abstract
Abstract This article reconstructs Yasuo Deguchi’s We-Turn framework through the lens of conditionalism, the view that events – including actions – are wholes composed of interconnected necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. This approach raises crucial questions about the individuation of such wholes, particularly in avoiding infinite regress and arbitrary system boundaries. I compare Deguchi’s analysis to a parallel strategy in the philosophy of mind, where conditionalism dissolves traditional versions of the mind-body problem by treating mental activity as an integrated whole in which mental and non-mental elements are co-constitutive. In this holistic view, there is no need to postulate a dualistic explanatory gap between the mental and the physical; instead, both are parts of a larger systemic unity. Within this context, I further explore the role of the subject – the “I” – in Deguchi’s framework, arguing that the We-Turn provides a promising path toward reconceiving subjectivity without relying on a metaphysically isolated or self-positing individual. Finally, I suggest that conditionalist holism and the We-Turn offer important resources for advancing contemporary debates at the intersection of the philosophy of mind, social ontology, and epistemology.