Conscious AI does not require computational functionalism, and consciousness may be non-biological, like flight
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2026 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x25103798 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Seth's claim that conscious AI is impossible if computational functionalism is false requires support, and uses an artificial flight analogy to show that even if human consciousness is ineliminably biological, non-biological computational AI may still be possible. |
Abstract
Abstract Seth’s argument relies on the unargued-for claim that if computational functionalism is false, conscious AI is impossible. I show why the claim is in need of support by way of an analogy. I use a different analogy, involving artificial flight, to show that even if human consciousness is ineliminably biological, this does not imply the impossibility of non-biological, computational AI.