The Gradability of ‘Conscious’
Andrew Y. Lee, Poppy Mankowitz
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research January 14, 2026 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.70074 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the question of whether some creatures are "more conscious" than others makes sense because "conscious" sometimes functions as a minimal-standard gradable adjective. The authors also explain why some theorists have been skeptical about gradable uses of "conscious," distinguish two interpretations of "phenomenal consciousness," and discuss how their semantic arguments bear on the metaphysical question of whether consciousness comes in degrees. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT Are some creatures “more conscious” than others? A number of consciousness researchers have aimed to answer this question. Yet some have claimed that this question does not even make sense. They claim that “conscious” (in the phenomenal sense) never occurs as a gradable adjective , meaning an adjective that permits degree expressions (“more f than,” “slightly f ,” etc.) and that is associated with a degreed property. Both sides face an explanatory burden: they must explain why some competent speakers seem confused about the meaning of “conscious.” We argue that the question does make sense: “conscious” sometimes functions as a minimal‐standard gradable adjective. But we will also explain why some theorists have been skeptical about gradable uses of “conscious.” Along the way, we address the objection that many gradable constructions involving “what it's like” expressions are infelicitous, distinguish two interpretations of “phenomenal consciousness,” and discuss how our semantic arguments bear on the metaphysical question of whether consciousness comes in degrees.