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Do we have (in)compatibilist phenomenology of deliberation?: a survey.

Souichiro Honma, Kiichi Inarimori, Kengo Miyazono

Frontiers in Psychology February 16, 2026 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1605079 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Free will Deliberation Experimental philosophy Incompatibilism Leeway freedom Source freedom
Key points Argues that the phenomenology of deliberation is relevant to compatibilist and incompatibilist accounts of leeway and source freedom, but that four methodological problems—heterogeneity, cognitive penetration, reliability, and relevance—undermine current experimental approaches and require rethinking both the methods used and the role this phenomenology should play in the free will debate.

Abstract

In this article, we survey contemporary works on the phenomenology of deliberation and discuss its relevance to the philosophical problems of free will. We first articulate the debate between compatibilist and incompatibilist interpretations of (leeway and source) freedom in the phenomenology of deliberation (Section 2). Next, we examine this issue in light of relevant psychological studies of the folk experiences of deliberation (Section 3), followed by a discussion of four general methodological problems in the investigation of the phenomenology of deliberation (Section 4): (i) the problem of heterogeneity, (ii) the problem of cognitive penetration, (iii) the problem of reliability, and (iv) the problem of relevance. We conclude that these problems suggest the need for the reconsideration of experimental methods and the role of the phenomenology of deliberation in the free will debate.

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