Stepan Baley's Contribution to Solving the Mind-Body Problem
Humanitarian Vision October 24, 2025 DOI: 10.23939/shv2025.02.017 (opens in new tab)
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Stepan Baley addressed the mind-body problem by defining consciousness, intentionality, and personality, opposing mental and physical phenomena while denying their identification, and treating consciousness in connection with the unconscious in line with classical introspective psychology. The author contends that Baley's distinction between real and ideal personality helps overcome the split between continental and cognitive philosophy. |
Abstract
The article analyses the approach of Ukrainian and Polish philosopher, psychologist, educator, and doctor Stepan Baley to solving the mind-body problem. Stefan Baley’s contribution to solving the mind-body problem was analysed from the perspective of the philosophical tradition in which he was formed under the direct influence of Kazimierz Twardowski and the indirect impact of Franz Brentano, as well as in light of contemporary discussions surrounding the naturalisation programme in the philosophy of mind. It has been established that Baley solved the mind-body problem by searching for answers to questions about the nature of physical and mental phenomena and their relationship and by defining concepts of consciousness, intentionality, and personality. Baley’s opposition to mental and physical phenomena and the simultaneous denial of the possibility of their identification has been revealed. Attention has been drawn to the philosopher’s consideration of consciousness in connection with the unconscious, and its consistency with classical introspective psychology has been proven. The potential of Baley’s approach to solving the mind-body problem in the context of distinguishing between real and ideal personality has been clarified. It has been found to contribute to overcoming the split between continental and cognitive philosophy, which consists of the former proving that there is no subject inside the brain. The latter asserts that there is no subject outside the brain by establishing a dialogue between philosophy and psychology.