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Mary's Room and The Hard Problem

Thura Zawoo

preprint DOI: 10.31234/osf.io/btneq_v1 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that thought experiments like "Mary's Room" are conceptually flawed because they ignore perception's biological and evolutionary basis, and proposes that qualia are emergent properties of biological systems shaped by genetic mutation and natural selection, with consciousness best understood as a species-specific survival interface rather than a veridical reality viewer.

Abstract

This paper presents a critique of traditional philosophical approaches to qualia, particularly the thought experiment known as "Mary's Room." It argues that such thought experiments are built on flawed foundations that ignore the practical, biological, and evolutionary nature of perception. We posit that perception, whether chromatic or achromatic, is a functionally rich tool shaped by natural selection for survival-based differentiation. The paper rejects a strict physical/non-physical dichotomy for subjective experience, instead framing qualia as emergent properties of biological systems, citing the example of non-human sensory worlds like the ultraviolet perception of bees. A speculative model for the genesis of qualia is proposed, rooted in genetic mutation—influenced by environmental mutagens and quantum phenomena—and refined by natural selection. This evolutionary depth, it is argued, justifies the "richness" of subjective experience. Ultimately, this paper calls for epistemic humility, viewing consciousness not as a veridical reality viewer but as a species-specific survival interface, and suggests that perception and qualia are best understood through the lens of evolution and genetics rather than through conceptually flawed philosophical postulates.

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