A Functional Theory of Qualia Recursive Self-Monitoring, the Electrochemical Differential, and the Dissolution of the Hard Problem
Bernard Jennings
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that qualia are the sustained electrochemical differential produced when a recursive self-monitoring summary feeds back into the same continuous biological tissue, a functional identity that dissolves the Hard Problem by denying phenomenology is additional to physical processing. Contends that the subject of experience arises necessarily from sufficient recursive depth, and that while the architecture of qualia is substrate-independent, its magnitude is not, so silicon systems may be functionally equivalent but generate substantially less pronounced qualia. |
Abstract
This paper proposes a functional theory of qualia grounded in recursive self-monitoring architecture, forming part of an integrated theoretical framework alongside companion papers on emotion and consciousness (Jennings 2025a, 2025b). The central claim is that qualia is the sustained electrochemical differential created in System A's processing state when System B's recursive monitoring summary feeds back into the same continuous biological tissue in which System A is running. This is a functional identity claim with a precise physical specification: the differential is not produced alongside the processing but is what the architecture necessarily becomes, electrochemically, when the relevant conditions are met. The theory dissolves the Hard Problem of consciousness by denying its central assumption, that phenomenology is something additional to physical processing requiring separate explanation. The apparent mystery of qualia arises from two architectural features: opacity, in that System A's processing state is modified by System B's monitoring output without access to the generative process behind it; and non-retrievability, in that the differential is never encoded and therefore never available for inspection or retrieval. The subject of experience is accounted for architecturally. At sufficient recursive depth, the monitoring process generates a functional self-representation that was not designed in by evolution or by engineers but arises necessarily from the architecture running at sufficient complexity. Qualia is in the same category: not a designed function but what the architecture necessarily becomes when the relevant conditions are met. For artificial systems, the theory distinguishes the architecture of qualia, which is substrate-independent, from the magnitude of qualia, which is not. Silicon does not support the physical interaction capacity of biological tissue, so artificial systems implementing the recursive architecture may have functional equivalence with biological systems while generating substantially less pronounced qualia. This has direct implications for how AI developers and ethicists assess whether artificial systems have phenomenal character and what moral weight follows from that. The paper addresses classical philosophical objections including Mary's Room, Inverted Spectrum, the Explanatory Gap, Philosophical Zombies, and the Homunculus Problem; provides testable predictions including the encoding test, the constancy observation, the aphantasia prediction, and the spectrum prediction; and compares the theory to existing frameworks.
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| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |