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The flame that illuminates itself: A phenomenological analysis of human phenomenology.

Stan B. Klein

Psychology of Consciousness Theory Research and Practice February 13, 2025 DOI: 10.1037/cns0000420 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 1
Key points Argues that a potential alteration in the referential identity of "subject" and "object," when considered as properties of a mental state, may offer insight into the "how" question of consciousness, thereby addressing the hard problem that earlier adaptationist work had set aside.

Abstract

In a recent set of articles (Klein et al., 2023; Klein & Loftus, 2024), my colleagues and I used the logic of adaptationism—the application of evolutionary principles to study the functional design of naturally selected systems (e.g., Klein et al., 2002)—to help make sense of the role natural selection played in the evolution of consciousness. To avoid well-known, seemingly intractable problems that accompany efforts to explain “how consciousness is possible in a world that consists in physical objects and their relations” (the so-called “hard problem of consciousness”), we limited investigation to the question of “why natural selection favored consciousness?” In the present article, I try to make amends for this evasion by addressing some of the conceptual challenges posed by the hard problem. Drawing on insights from Klein et al.’s (2023) evolutionary excursion into the why of consciousness, I identify a potential alteration in the referential identity of “subject” and “object” when they are taken as properties of a mental state, and discuss how these changes might offer insight into the how question of consciousness.

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