The Hard Problem as a Category Error
James Wyngarde
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) March 16, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18681058 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the Hard Problem of consciousness rests on the mistaken assumption that the same functional processes could occur without experience. Grounded in thermodynamics and biological function, the paper contends that the demand for an explanation beyond function mistakes a limit of description for a gap in nature, and that the apparent gap arises from reflective cognition rather than from reality's structure. |
Abstract
The Hard Problem of consciousness asks why physical processes give rise to subjective experience rather than proceeding without phenomenal character. In simpler terms, it asks why it feels like something to perceive, hurt, or want. The question rests on the assumption that the same functional processes could occur in the absence of experience. This paper rejects that assumption. The account is grounded in thermodynamics and biological function. The demand for explanation beyond function mistakes a limit of description for a gap in nature. The apparent gap arises from reflective cognition, not from the structure of reality.
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