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Artificial suffering: an argument for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology (Reprint)

Thomas Metzinger

DepositOnce 2026 DOI: 10.14279/depositonce-26150 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Proposes a global moratorium until 2050 that strictly bans research directly aiming at or knowingly risking artificial consciousness on post-biotic carrier systems, and argues for an open-ended, evidence-based process to refine the moratorium, which could lead to its repeal, extension, or a more nuanced position on implementing conscious experience in AI.

Abstract

This paper has a critical and a constructive part. The first part formulates a political demand, based on ethical considerations: Until 2050, there should be a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology, strictly banning all research that directly aims at or knowingly risks the emergence of artificial consciousness on post-biotic carrier systems. The second part lays the first conceptual foundations for an open-ended process with the aim of gradually refining the original moratorium, tying it to an ever more fine-grained, rational, evidence-based, and hopefully ethically convincing set of constraints. The systematic research program defined by this process could lead to an incremental reformulation of the original moratorium. It might result in a moratorium repeal even before 2050, in the continuation of a strict ban beyond the year 2050, or a gradually evolving, more substantial, and ethically refined view of which—if any—kinds of conscious experience we want to implement in AI systems.

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