A new threat against phenomenal unity? An argument based on depersonalization and derealization symptoms

Abstract

According to a venerable phenomenological claim which is still quite authoritative nowadays, our phenomenal field is necessarily unified at a time t . This means that everything we simultaneously experience in the first person is subjectively, representationally or at least phenomenally unified. Against this background, Tim Bayne (2010) provides an insightful overview of the various descriptive or empirical challenges to subjective and representational unity while also demonstrating that the claim of phenomenal unity singularly resists these objections. The primary objective of my article, however, is to critically examine the robustness of the phenomenal unity claim, highlighting a specific neuro-divergent condition: “Depersonalization and Derealization Disorder.” In doing so, I aim to introduce a new argument against the phenomenal unity of consciousness. My second objective is to draw on recent empirical evidence linking DPDR symptoms to the use of virtual reality (VR) to explore whether VR could be regarded as an indirect threat to phenomenal unity.