A Vaiṣṇava Theory of Consciousness
Philosophy East and West December 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1353/pew.2025.a977852 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a Vaiṣṇava theory of consciousness can be outlined and defended, that it differs from Cartesian substance dualism in certain respects, and that it faces many of the same objections, two of which—the neural dependency objection and the interaction problem—the author addresses. |
Abstract
Though there is a vast literature on philosophy of mind, there have been few attempts to defend a Vaiṣṇava theory of consciousness. In this paper, I outline one such theory, distinguish it from Cartesian substance dualism, and defend it. I also note that though this theory differs from Cartesian substance dualism in certain respects, it faces many of the same objections. I then address two of these objections: the neural dependency objection and the interaction problem.