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Evolution, Consciousness, and Social Cognition

Evgeny V. Loginov

Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 2026 DOI: 10.5840/eps20266316 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that Perconti's social cognition approach to consciousness faces a methodological problem, namely the presumption that evolution favors only functionally useful traits, and a metaphysical problem, namely that social cognition may not account for the subjective nature of consciousness. Proposes that consciousness could be evolutionarily neutral or negative and calls for a more comprehensive account of its origins and functions.

Abstract

In his paper, Professor Pietro Perconti advocates a social cognition approach to understanding human consciousness, arguing that self-consciousness enhances social cognition. Perconti supports his argument with empirical evidence showing that social cognition capabilities precede the development of self-consciousness in children. However, this paper raises two concerns with his reasoning: the methodological challenge of explaining consciousness through evolutionary processes and the metaphysical issue related to ontological commitments within the social cognition framework. Methodologically, the paper questions the presumption that evolutionary processes favor only functionally useful traits. Metaphysically, the paper scrutinizes the implications of understanding consciousness purely through social cognition, suggesting that such an approach may not fully account for the subjective nature of consciousness. Additionally, the paper highlights the potential for consciousness to be a neutral or even negative trait from an evolutionary perspective. The critique ultimately calls for a more comprehensive exploration of the origins and functions of consciousness, beyond its relationship to social cognition.