Consciousness and the Divine

Abstract

This issue of Agatheos has its origins in an important passing of a torch within the philosophy of religion.Linda Zagzebski was the Kingfisher Chair in Religion and Ethics at the University of Oklahoma for over twenty years until her retirement in 2021.She was succeeded in January of 2024 by Yujin Nagasawa, who left a research chair in Birmingham for the honor.Zagzebski and Nagasawa, in addition to being leading figures in the philosophy of religion, have robust interests in the philosophy of mind.In both cases, there are important connection points and overlaps in their work in these two areas of philosophy.In particular, both see important connections between the unique place of consciousness and subjectivity in our lives and debates in the philosophy of religion that are not always or even typically prosecuted in that light.In addition, Nagasawa has an abiding interest in panpsychism, both its promise and problems, while Zagzebski has a similar interest in the prospects and peculiarities of panentheism as an elaboration of theism.To celebrate the instalment of Prof. Nagasawa as the Kingfisher Chair, a conference was convened with leading figures who work in both the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of mind giving talks in addition to keynote addresses by Profs.Nagasawa and Zagzebski.This volume reproduces those keynote addresses, now complemented by four papers solicited by Agatheos that interact in one way or another with the themes explored there.An early example of this intersection between the philosophy of religion and philosophy of mind in Nagasawa's work comes in the form of his first monograph, God and Phenomenal Consciousness (2008).In that book, he traces unappreciated parallels between arguments concerned with the epistemic status of someone who has an experience of something for the first time and certain atheological arguments.In Frank Jackson's famous thought experiment (1986), Mary is a color scientist who lives in a black and white world.Despite Mary having a great deal of propositional knowledge about, say, the physiology and physics that come with color processing, it seems like Mary comes to know something new when she sees red for the first time.It seems like no knowledge about the physical underpinnings of red experiences or the