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The Argument from Consciousness and Divine Consciousness

Thomas Schärtl

European Journal for Philosophy of Religion March 21, 2013 DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v5i1.254 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 2
Key points Argues that the first-person perspective of consciousness uniquely supports a theistic explanation and that divine knowledge should be understood as knowledge of things rather than knowledge of facts.

Abstract

The paper aims for an improvement of the so-called argument from consciousness while focusing on the first-person-perspective as a unique feature of consciousness that opens the floor for a theistic explanation. As a side effect of knowledge arguments, which are necessary to keep a posterior materialism off bounds, the paper proposes an interpretation of divine knowledge as knowledge of things rather than knowledge of facts.