The Buddhist Trace in the Mysticism and Philosophy of G. I. Gurdjieff and P. D. Ouspensky
Pushkin Leningrad State University Journal 2026 DOI: 10.35231/18186653_2026_1_40 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism Mysticism |
| Key points | Argues that the Gurdjieff-Ouspensky "Fourth Way" system's claims that "human is a mechanism," that there is no permanent "self," and that self-consciousness is illusory parallel Buddhist philosophy of consciousness. The author hypothesizes that Gurdjieff borrowed these propositions from Buddhism and contends that the parallels with the Buddhist teaching of anatmavada ("no-soul") support this hypothesis. |
Abstract
Introduction. This article analyzes the anthropological aspects of the teachings of the G. I. Gurdjieff and the Russian philosopher P. D. Ouspensky. Specifically, it examines the fundamental theses of both thinkers' about of human in comparison with similar concepts in Buddhism. Content. Analyzes the meaning of the central thesis in the anthropology of G. I. Gurdjieff and P. D. Ouspensky: "human is a mechanism." The article reveals the significance of the anthropological propositions in the Gurdjieff-Ouspensky system derived from this thesis: the doctrine of the absence of a "permanent “self”" and the illusory of self-consciousness. It hypothesizes that G. Gurdjieff borrowed these propositions from Buddhist philosophy of consciousness. Arguments are given in favor of this hypothesis. Conclusions. The conclusions formulate propositions that point to identical aspects of Gurdjieff-Ouspensky's "Fourth Way" system and the Buddhist teaching on the "no-soul"– anatmavada–supporting the validity of the stated hypothesis.