Disembodied Cogito and Embodied Subjectivity: With Special Reference to Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Abstract

This paper seeks to elucidate the discourse concerning the issue of the ‘mind’. The inquiry begins with the issue of Cartesian Dualism and aims to investigate its problematic nature. This paper also seeks to examine the intricate distinctions between 'consciousness-in-itself' and 'awareness of' by analysing the meaning of consciousness. It additionally aims to investigate if the Cartesian cogito, commonly referred to as the Disembodied Cogito, may redefine this dualism when applied to Embodied Subjectivity. In this regard, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Body-Subject as purposeful has been introduced to demonstrate that the segmented definition of mind as res-cogitans and body as res-extensa cannot serve as the definitive classification. In reality, when we incorporate subjectivity and qualify it with embodiedness, the distinction between being within the box or outside of it becomes invalid, as we see that there is no box to strictly compartmentalise the body as res-extensa and the mind as res-cogitans. This work, therefore, seeks to ascertain whether the dichotomy of mind and body may be integrated within a broader holistic theoretical framework.