A Constructive Ontology of Minded Beings
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) July 30, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21701270 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the trilogy advances through organized persistence at three levels—subjecthood, selfhood, and personhood—and that functionalism, enactivism, predictive processing, and recognition theory often address different explanatory levels rather than being mutually exclusive. |
Abstract
The cover paper, A Constructive Ontology of Minded Beings, is not a fourth theoretical contribution so much as the interpretive frame for the trilogy (Paper I on minimal subject: 10.5281/zenodo.21700484, Paper II on minimal self: 10.5281/zenodo.21700773, Paper III on minimal person: 10.5281/zenodo.21700984). It explains that the project is built around three distinct ontological questions: why experience belongs to anything at all, why it belongs to the same thing across time, and why a continuing self becomes a publicly accountable person. Its core claim is that the trilogy advances by organized persistence at three levels: subjecthood, selfhood, and personhood. It also situates the trilogy within contemporary philosophy of mind. Rather than trying to replace functionalism, enactivism, predictive processing, or recognition theory, it argues that these approaches often address different explanatory levels. The cover paper clarifies the trilogy’s constructive method, states its limits, explains how it should be evaluated, and records the canonical release information for the published papers.