On describing mental states.
The British journal of medical psychology December 1987 DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8341.1987.tb02748.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Wittgenstein's later critique of treating psychological reports as descriptions of inner states and processes has important implications for descriptive psychopathology and for how psychological models are used in psychiatry. |
Abstract
The later work of Wittgenstein was a major contribution to the philosophy of mind. One theme in his writings was a critique of the assumption that reports of psychological experience in ordinary language can be regarded as descriptions of inner states and processes. Some implications of this critique for our understanding of descriptive psychopathology and the use of psychological models in psychiatry are examined.