Religious Experience and Religious Diversity: A Reply to Alston
Religious Studies June 1, 1994 DOI: 10.1017/s003441250000144x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that engaging in the Christian form of the 'mystical perceptual practice' is epistemically rational: participants are justified in forming beliefs about the Ultimate on the basis of putative 'direct experiential awareness' because the practice is 'socially established', has a 'functioning overrider system' and 'a significant degree of self-support', and lacks sufficient reasons to be deemed unreliable. |
Abstract
William Alston's Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991) is a most significant contribution to the philosophy of religion. The product of 50 years' reflection on its topic (xi), this work provides a very thorough explication and defence of what Alston calls the ‘mystical perceptual practice’ (MP) – the practice of forming beliefs about the Ultimate on the basis of putative ‘direct experiential awareness’ thereof (pp. 103, 258). Alston argues, in particular, for the (epistemic) rationality of engaging in the Christian form of MP (CMP). On his view, those who participate in CMP are (in the absence of specific overriding considerations from within CMP) justified in forming beliefs as they do because their practice is ‘socially established’, has a ‘functioning overrider system’ and a ‘significant degree of self-support’; and because of the ‘lack of sufficient reasons to take the practice as unreliable’ (p. 224).