A problem with Alston's indirect analogy-argument from religious experience
Ulf Zackariasson
Religious Studies September 1, 2006 DOI: 10.1017/s0034412506008432 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Alston's argument from religious experience, framed as an indirect analogy-argument, is significantly weaker than generally assumed because it neglects a required functional similarity between sense perception and religious experience, and that emphasizing 'fruits' cannot rescue the argument given Alston's commitments to religious exclusivism and religious metaphysical realism. |
Abstract
In this paper, William Alston's argument from religious experience in Perceiving God is characterized and assessed as an indirect analogy-argument. Such arguments, I propose, should establish two similarities between sense perception (SP) and religious experience (CMP): a structural and a functional. I argue that Alston neglects functional similarity, and that SP and CMP actually perform different functions within the practices they belong to. Alston's argument is therefore significantly weaker than generally assumed. Finally, I argue that regardless of whether an increased emphasis on fruits could strengthen indirect analogy-arguments or not, this is not a strategy available to Alston as long as he retains his commitments to religious exclusivism and a religious metaphysical realism.