Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia
Andrew Crider
Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00040401 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that while Gray's septohippocampal model of segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia is consistent with neuropsychological evidence, it minimally addresses prefrontal executive mechanisms that the authors contend are also involved in everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia. |
Abstract
AbstractSegmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.
Citations in the library
Cites 10
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- Advances in Consciousness Research Advances in Consciousness Research December 16, 2013
- Consciousness, dreams and virtual realities Philosophical Psychology 1995
- Consciousness and Brain Archives of General Psychiatry August 1, 1973
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