Mind in the World
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Presents John R. Searle's concept of intentionality, the directedness of mind or language at objects, and situates it in a history running from Aristotle through medieval scholastic philosophers to Franz Brentano, who reintroduced the term into European philosophy. Searle is described as a critic of both materialist and dualist traditions in the study of mind and as the author of the "Chinese Room" argument against theories of artificial intelligence. |
Abstract
As the title of my article can indicate, the primary aim of this „brief introduction" is to present the concept of intentionality of one of the world's leading philosophers John R. Searle. Searle is known for his severe criticism of the dominant traditions in the study of mind, both materialist and dualist, and we may also recall his familiar argument called „the Chinese Room" against theories of „artificial intelligence". The concept of intentionality was founded when philosophers attempted to describe and solve the philosophical problem of specific „quasi-relations" between consciousness and objects and the direction of our mind or language to the real world. I am referring to situations in which we say for instance: „A thinks about p", ,JB maintains that g", „X asks question if y" and so on. „Intentionality" is a technical philosophical term which means being directed at, about or of objects. This term has a long history in philosophy. It is generally considered that the concept of intentionality was originally used by scholastic philosophers in the Middle Ages, and then it was reintroduced into European philosophy by the Austrian philosopher Franz Brentano (1833-1917). Today we know that Aristotle formulated explicitly the problem of intentionality and also made