Mental phenomena as changes of state in a finite-state machine.
The Australian and New Zealand journal of psychiatry June 1986 DOI: 10.3109/00048678609161328 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that cognition, affection, and conation are circularly defined and that this circularity reflects the unity of conscious experience, making the search for separate biological substrates of each function a form of phrenology. Proposes instead that mental phenomena be modeled as state changes in a finite-state machine, an approach the author holds is compatible with Karl Jaspers's phenomenology and could reframe neurobiological research and mental pathology as aberrations of dynamic processes. |
Abstract
This paper examines the classical functions of the psyche--cognition, affection and conation--from a phenomenological viewpoint and finds them to be defined each in terms of the other. It is held that this circularity of definition reflects the fundamental unity of conscious experience and, as a consequence, that the search for the biological substrate underlying individual functions too readily degenerates into a morphological and biochemical phrenology. An alternative approach, based on considerations from the field of artificial intelligence, is discussed. This approach provides a description of mental phenomena as changes of state in a finite-state machine, the next state being determined by both previous states and current inputs. This concept is shown to be compatible with the descriptions of conscious experience outlined in the phenomenology of Karl Jaspers. It is suggested that neurobiological investigations should be directed towards defining the processes by which state changes occur and further seeking to define mental pathology as aberrations of these dynamic processes.