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Are mental states a useful concept? Neurophilosophical influences on phenomenology and psychopathology.

P J Harrison

The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease June 1, 1991 DOI: 10.1097/00005053-199106000-00002 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Humans Mental processes Cognition Mental disorders Psychopathology Neurosciences Models, neurological Models, psychological Terminology as topic
Key points Argues that approaches to phenomenology and psychopathology cannot remain immune to conceptual reconfigurations of normal mental life arising from the neurophilosophical debate over "folk psychology," and discusses how psychiatric theory and practice may be affected by these developments.

Abstract

Recent trends in neurophilosophy question the validity of conceptions as to the nature of mental states and of "folk psychology" (FP) in general. One school of thought, the "eliminative materialistics," see FP as a misdirected and scientifically redundant approach to the mind which should be discarded; the "functionalists," in contrast, consider FP categories, such as belief, to be essential. Between these extremes other neurophilosophical positions affect the way we view mental life. This paper extends the debate to include a consideration of abnormal mental states. It is argued that approaches to phenomenology and psychopathology cannot be immune from any conceptual reconfiguration of normal mental life which might occur. The manner and extent to which psychiatric theory and practice may be affected as a result of these developments is discussed.

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