The Logic of Mysticism—II
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement March 1, 1992 DOI: 10.1017/s1358246100002113 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Mysticism |
| Key points | Argues that mysticism is alogical rather than illogical, and that Wittgenstein, Russell, and Ayer, while approaching the issue differently, converge on the view that mystical or absolute-value statements fail to give sense to their terms, amounting to nonsense rather than contradiction or invalid reasoning. |
Abstract
To talk of a logic of mysticism may sound distinctly odd. If anything, mysticism is alogical; it would be uncharitable if not false, on mature consideration, to call it illogical—though many, without due deliberation, might be tempted to use that term. Wittgenstein comes close to calling it illogical. In his lecture on ethics he draws attention to the logical oddity of statements of absolute value (Wittgenstein 1965). But he does not accuse the mystics or prophets or religious teachers of contradicting themselves or of invalid reasoning. What he accuses them of may be something worse, namely, talking nonsense, of not giving sense to the words they use or the expressions they utter. Russell (1921) and Ayer (1936) come to much the same conclusion but by a different route.