Mystical Experience and Non–Basically Justified Belief
Religious Studies September 1, 1989 DOI: 10.1017/s0034412500019880 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Mystical experience |
| Key points | The text presents the foundationalist thesis that a class of empirical contingent beliefs is 'immediately justified'—also called 'self-evident', 'non-inferentially justified', or 'self-warranted'—and that these 'basic beliefs' ground empirical knowledge without deriving their warrant from other beliefs. It illustrates this with Chisholm's example that the fact of thinking about a city one takes to be Albuquerque can itself justify that belief. |
Abstract
Two theses are central to foundationalism. First, the foundationalist claims that there is a class of propositions, a class of empirical contingent beliefs, that are ‘immediately justified’. Alternatively, one can describe these beliefs as ‘self–evident’, ‘non–inferentially justified’, or ‘self–warranted’, though these are not always regarded as entailing one another. The justification or epistemic warrant for these beliefs is not derived from other justified beliefs through inductive evidential support or deductive methods of inference. These ‘basic beliefs’ constitute the foundations of empirical knowledge. One can give a reason for the justification of a basic belief even though the justification for that belief is not based on other beliefs. Thus, according to Chisholm, if asked what one's justification was for thinking that one knew, presently, that one is thinking about a city one takes to be Albuquerque, one could simply say ‘what justifies me…is simply the fact that I am thinking about a city I take to be Albuquerque’.