Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience
Richard Swinburne
Knowledge, Belief, and God February 22, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198798705.003.0017 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the principle of credulity central to phenomenal conservatism holds under some senses of 'belief', 'justified', and 'evidence' but fails under others, and proposes that distinguishing the many senses of 'justified' or 'rational' clarifies religious claims about religious experience. |
Abstract
Abstract: Phenomenal conservativism in epistemology is a view which endorses the principle of credulity: namely, the principle that every belief with which a person finds himself is a justified belief (one which the believer is justified in having) in the absence of any evidence that the belief is false (which might take the form of evidence that the belief has been produced by an unreliable process). This chapter investigates the senses of ‘belief’, ‘justified’, and ‘evidence’ on which this doctrine is true, and the senses in which it is false. It concentrates in particular on the many different senses in which a belief can be said to be ‘justified’ or ‘rational’; and it applies these results to religious claims concerning religious experience.