The Intolerance of Ambiguity and the Philosopher: Merleau-Ponty’s Reception of Frenkel-Brunswik’s Concepts
Antonia Schirgi
Human Studies August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s10746-026-09857-x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis Peer reviewed |
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| Key points | Argues that Merleau-Ponty's reception of Frenkel-Brunswik's concepts of ambiguity and ambivalence enabled him to articulate more clearly the relation between emotional and cognitive aspects, moving from ambiguity of perception to ambiguity in expression and from being confronted with ambiguity to dealing with it, which became central to his philosophy in the 1950s. |
Abstract
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has, from very early on, been labelled a “philosophy of ambiguity” (Ferdinand Alquié, Alphonse de Waelhens). In the early 1950s he encountered different psychoanalytical and psychological concepts of ambiguity and ambivalence (particularly in the work of Melanie Klein and Else Frenkel-Brunswik) that he integrated into his philosophy of ambiguity. This incorporation, and particularly the reception of Frenkel-Brunswik’s concepts has so far not been studied in detail. However, this reception is important because it enabled Merleau-Ponty to articulate more clearly the relation between emotional and cognitive aspects and to move from ambiguity of perception to ambiguity in expression, from being confronted with ambiguity to dealing with ambiguity, which is central to Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in the 1950s. This article traces the reception of Frenkel-Brunswik’s work by Merleau-Ponty and its further impact on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in the intermediary phase in the first half of the 1950s.