Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism
Views into the Chinese Room August 22, 2002 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198250579.003.0019 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the relationship between syntax and physics, which underlies Searle's critique of computationalism, deserves examination, suggesting that syntax may not be intrinsic to physics, thereby questioning the foundations of computational theories of mind. |
Abstract
Abstract In 1994 John Searle stated (Searle 1994: 11-12) that the Chinese Room Argument (CRA) is an attempt to prove the truth of the premise: led him to the conclusion that ‘programs are not minds’ and hence that computationalism, the idea that the essence of thinking lies in computational processes and that such processes thereby underlie and explain conscious thinking, is false. The argument presented in this chapter is not a direct attack or defence of the CRA, but relates to the premise at its heart, that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, via the closely associated propositions that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax and that syntax is not intrinsic to physics.1 However, in contrast to the CRA’s critique of the link between syntax and semantics, this chapter will explore the associated link between syntax and physics.