Explicitness and nonconnectionist vehicle theories of consciousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences April 1, 2004 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x04280074 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that O'Brien and Opie's reliance on structural explicitness and its necessity/sufficiency for consciousness is flawed, and that stability does not distinguish conscious from unconscious states. Proposes that a vehicle theory can be developed without these assumptions, favoring hybrid connectionist-symbolic models. |
Abstract
Abstract O'Brien & Opie's connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness is heavily dependent on their notion of explicitness as (1) structural and (2) necessary and sufficient for consciousness. These assumptions unnecessarily constrain their position: the authors are forced to find an intrinsic property of patterns that accounts for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. Their candidate property, stability, does not capture this distinction. Yet, I show that we can drop assumptions (1) and (2) and still develop a vehicle theory of consciousness. This alternative is better served by models that incorporate both connectionist and symbolic representations.