The Stream of Consciousness: XVIII. Introducing the State-Appropriative Acts
Imagination, Cognition and Personality October 1, 1998 DOI: 10.2190/xegr-d9u9-7892-vq7l (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that James's thesis that every state of consciousness is an appropriation to oneself faces objections, and that his parenthetical digression on the lack of unmediated awareness of other states remains an unresolved attraction. |
Abstract
From within the stream of consciousness, according to William James, there take place very frequently acts of “appropriation” to oneself of other basic durational components of the stream. Some components are thus “owned,” but some are “disowned”; also, “assent” is bestowed on the contents of some states of consciousness, whereas others may be rejected as false or unacceptable. At one point, James suggests that every state of consciousness belonging to one's stream of consciousness is an appropriation to oneself; otherwise, the stream would not hang together as a single mental whole. This article explicates the latter thesis and raises certain objections to it, while acquainting the reader with James's account of the state-appropriative acts. Also addressed here is a “parenthetical digression” that occurs as James introduces the state-appropriative acts: He is strongly attracted by the view, which he sets aside for the present, that no state of consciousness provides unmediated awareness of any other state of consciousness.