Is social cognition embodied?
Alvin Goldman, Frédérique De Vignemont
Trends in Cognitive Sciences April 2009 DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the most interesting interpretation of embodied cognition is that mental representations in bodily formats ("B-formats") play an important role in cognition, and that mirroring research supports only a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition. The authors contend this thesis cannot readily be extended, showing the limits of embodiment in social cognition. |
Abstract
Theories of embodied cognition abound in the literature, but it is often unclear how to understand them. We offer several interpretations of embodiment, the most interesting being the thesis that mental representations in bodily formats (B-formats) have an important role in cognition. Potential B-formats include motoric, somatosensory, affective and interoceptive formats. The literature on mirroring and related phenomena provides support for a limited-scope version of embodied social cognition under the B-format interpretation. It is questionable, however, whether such a thesis can be extended. We show the limits of embodiment in social cognition.
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