Loss of the sense of self-ownership for perceptions of objects in a case of right inferior temporal, parieto-occipital and precentral hypometabolism.
Roland Zahn, Jochen Talazko, Dieter Ebert
Psychopathology 2008 DOI: 10.1159/000158228 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Case study Case report Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Sample size | 1 |
| Population | A patient with selective loss of self-ownership for perceptions of objects |
| Key findings | The patient showed selective loss of self-ownership for object perceptions, with intact self-ownership for body perceptions and self-agency. Hypometabolism was found in right inferior temporal, parieto-occipital, and motor regions, but not in medial prefrontal areas, suggesting that different aspects of the minimal self rely on anatomically separable systems. |
Abstract
Philosophers define the 'minimal self' as the immediate awareness of being the agent and owner of one's actions and perceptions. Here, we describe a patient with a selective loss of one part of this 'minimal self', namely the immediate sense of self-ownership for perceptions of objects. In contrast, his sense of self-ownership for body perceptions and for self-agency during actions remained intact. 18-Fluorodeoxyglucose positron emission tomography revealed predominantly right inferior temporal hypometabolism in comparison with healthy controls (parahippocampal and fusiform gyri). In addition, dysfunction of the right parieto-occipital junction and precentral cortex were detected. Taken together, we demonstrate selective changes in the quality of the sense of self-ownership for perceptions of objects but not actions and an intact sense of self-agency, which points to anatomically separable systems underpinning different aspects of the 'minimal self'. The associated hypometabolism in inferior temporal, parieto-occipital and motor regions, but not in medial prefrontal areas most consistently associated with self-referential processing, are most parsimoniously explained when self-consciousness is not assumed to be an anatomically localized cognitive function, but instead is conceived as emerging from integration across anatomically distributed networks of regions with different functional specializations, not all of which need to be special for the 'self'.
Citations in the library
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- Recent developments in philosophy of mind and psychopathology Current Opinion in Psychiatry July 30, 2010
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