An Enactivist Critique of the Non-Conceptualist Argument for the Richness of Perception and Its Model of Perceptual Content
Princípios: Revista de Filosofia December 9, 2025 DOI: 10.21680/1983-2109.2025v32n69id39202 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the non-conceptualist argument from the richness of perception fails within sensorimotor enactivism because enactivism rejects the internal detailed representations that argument presupposes. Proposes that enactivism offers a better account of perception's non-conceptual nature through sensorimotor skills and immediate environmental access, without positing internal representations. |
Abstract
In this article, we will critically analyze the non-conceptualist argument for the richness of perception from the sensorimotor enactivist tradition. According to non-conceptualists, the content of perception is far richer and more detailed than the content of our beliefs. The non-conceptualist model of perceptual content assumes that we possess an internal, detailed representation of the environment. The enactivist approach, however, rejects the idea that we construct internal representations of the environment in order to perceive it. The fact that we have immediate access to the environment through sensorimotor skills makes the reconstruction of the environment in the form of mental representations unnecessary. If this is the case, the argument for the richness of perception is inadequate for defending a non-conceptualist approach. Our suggestion is that enactivism provides a better explanation of the non-conceptual nature of perception without postulating the need for internal, detailed representations of the environment.