Consciousness, by Christopher S. Hill.

Abstract

In Consciousness, Christopher Hill presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. He provides an account of perceptual consciousness, introspective consciousness, conscious thought, and along the way addresses numerous issues that have come up in the literature concerning conscious experience. Not only does he cover pretty much all the issues a theory of consciousness ought to address, he fairly seamlessly combines philosophical and empirical considerations and arguments in a way that exemplifies what good interdisciplinary work can accomplish. Hill has clearly articulated just about the best case there is for the sort of naturalistic theory of consciousness he offers. Let me briefly lay out the main lines of his theory. His main target is what he calls ‘phenomenal consciousness’, which, for him, is ‘experiential consciousness’ of qualitative characteristics. (Another important form of consciousness that he discusses in detail is ‘introspective consciousness’.) To explain phenomenal consciousness, then, requires first an account of experiential consciousness, or awareness, and then an account of qualia. Experiential consciousness, in turn, breaks down into the property of being experiential and the property of being a form of awareness. So once we know what awareness is, under what conditions it counts as experiential, and the nature of its proprietary objects, qualia, we know what phenomenal consciousness is.