Hedonic Consciousness and Moral Status
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind June 25, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780198994121.003.0011 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that moral status requires hedonic feelings, not just consciousness, and that consciousness cannot be both necessary and sufficient for moral status without excluding Vulcans alongside zombies. |
Abstract
Abstract Which beings have moral status? This chapter argues that moral status requires some capacity for hedonic feelings of pleasure or displeasure. David Chalmers rejects this view on the grounds that it denies moral status to Vulcans, which are defined as conscious creatures with no capacity for hedonic feelings. On his more inclusive view, all conscious beings have moral status. Both views agree that only conscious beings have moral status, but they disagree about how to explain this. This chapter argues that we cannot explain why consciousness is necessary for moral status without denying that it is sufficient for moral status. Hence, we cannot exclude unconscious zombies without excluding conscious Vulcans too.