Conspiracy Hinges, Delusions, and Mystical Experiences
Social and Applied Hinge Epistemology June 26, 2026 DOI: 10.1093/9780197834022.003.0016 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Mystical experience |
| Key points | Argues that delusions and conspiracy theories should be distinguished using etiology and phenomenological deviance rather than numbers of believers, and that the classification of mystical experiences as delusions depends on cultural recognition and empirical explanations. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter examines the relationship between delusions and conspiracy theories through the lens of hinge epistemology. While delusions may be understood as irrational acceptances that conflict with de facto or de jure hinges, conspiracy beliefs—such as flat-earth or COVID-19 anti-vaccination theories—share certain features with delusions, including steadfastness in the face of contrary evidence and reinterpretation of such evidence to support the believer’s position. Despite surface similarities, the chapter argues for distinguishing delusions from conspiracy theories while providing a hinge-based account of the latter. Standard distinctions between delusions and conspiracy theories based on numbers of believers are inadequate; instead, etiology and phenomenological deviance provide better criteria to demarcate delusions from conspiracy theories. The chapter further considers mystical experiences, as classified by the DSM-5, showing that their classification as delusions or veritable mystical experiences depends on cultural recognition and the availability of empirical explanations. Overall, the hinge framework illuminates the structure and rational evaluation of these classes of non-ordinary beliefs.