From Physics to Metaphysics: Scientific Success, Ontological Commitment, and the Limits of Scientism; An Islamic Epistemological Postscript
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) August 27, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.22131406 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that empirical physics underdetermines physicalist ontology, that the hard problem of consciousness resists physicalist reduction, and that predictive success (as with LLMs) does not settle internal ontology. Proposes an epistemic framework grounded in classical Islamic epistemology (yaqīn) to integrate science and metaphysics without scientism. |
Abstract
This paper critically examines the inferential jump from empirical physics to physicalist ontology and scientism. Moving beyond traditional self-defeat critiques, it engages directly with contemporary strong scientism defenses (Rosenberg, Carroll) and evaluates the pragmatic rejoinder. The paper develops two key original arguments: (1) the hard problem of consciousness as a persistent explanatory gap resisting physicalist reduction, and (2) a novel analogy with Large Language Models (LLMs), demonstrating how predictive success underdetermines internal ontology. Finally, it analyzes fine-tuning in cosmology and proposes an alternative epistemic framework rooted in classical Islamic epistemology (the three degrees of certainty: yaqīn), offering a non-scientistic, non-concordist integration of scientific inquiry and metaphysics.