Fragmented Minds, Fragile Foundations: Dissociation as Conceptual Disruption in Psychology

Abstract

Dissociation occupies a paradoxical position within psychology: widely recognised in clinical practice yet persistently marginal in theoretical discourse. This paper argues that dissociation is not merely a pathological anomaly but a phenomenon that exposes the fragility of psychology’s foundational assumptions. Through a historical analysis of the intellectual divergence between Pierre Janet’s theory of structural dissociation and Sigmund Freud’s model of repression, the paper identifies an early disciplinary fault line between fragmentation and psychic cohesion. Freud’s framework preserved an image of the unified, rational subject, whereas Janet’s account revealed the structural vulnerability of consciousness under traumatic stress. Extending this historical debate, the paper contends that dissociation challenges three core assumptions embedded in modern psychological thought: the unity of the self, the primacy of rational governance, and the linear continuity of consciousness. Drawing on trauma research, neuroscience, and contemporary philosophy of mind, dissociation is reframed as evidence that integration is a developmental and relational achievement rather than a metaphysical guarantee. The analysis further incorporates embodied and relational models of identity to demonstrate that fragmentation may reflect not only intrapsychic disruption but also sociocultural rupture. Rather than destabilising psychology destructively, dissociation functions as a conceptual disruption that invites epistemological humility and theoretical renewal.