Is the Problem of Artificial Consciousness a Scientific Problem?
Journal of Consciousness Studies August 1, 2026 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.33.7.209 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the assumption that science should determine which artificial systems are conscious is not self-evidently justified and requires explicit examination. The paper contends that deferring to science involves philosophical presuppositions that need scrutiny, and that the problem of artificial consciousness cannot be fully resolved by scientific discovery alone. |
Abstract
Is the problem of artificial consciousness a fundamentally scientific problem, one that we should attempt to address by means of scientific discovery? Although a positive answer to this question is widely assumed, there has been surprisingly little explicit discussion of this question. That neglect is unfortunate, for the issue is central to how we approach the challenge of artificial consciousness. This paper examines the claim that we ought to defer to science in determining which (if any) artificial systems are conscious. I ask what exactly that claim involves, whether it is justified, and what its implications might be.
Citations in the library
Cites 13
- Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience July 1, 2022
- The Value of Consciousness Analysis July 1, 2019
- Phenomenal Concepts Philosophy Compass March 28, 2011
- Extrapolating Other Consciousnesses: The Prospects and Limits of Analogical Abduction Philosophy of Science August 27, 2025
- Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems. Trends in Cognitive Sciences June 1, 2026
and 8 more in the library