The Second Meditation and Objections to Cartesian Dualism
Early Modern Philosophy May 19, 2005 DOI: 10.1093/0195177606.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Meditation |
| Key points | Argues that Descartes's arguments for mind-body distinction in the Second and Sixth Meditations are distinct, not two stages of a single argument, despite appearances; the Second Meditation's conclusion plays no formal role in the Sixth. Proposes that these distinct arguments map onto differing classic reactions to Cartesian dualism, and offers support for the most radical line of criticism. |
Abstract
AbstractIn 1978, two books were published that became standard commentaries on Descartes's Meditations. One was Bernard Williams's Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, the other Margaret Wilson's Descartes. This chapter starts from an issue of interpretation to which both books give some prominence, and which concerns the structure of Descartes' argument for his distinction between mind and body. It suggests that what are presented and can appear as two stages of Descartes's argument in the Second and Sixth Meditations are distinct arguments, although both build on the skeptical argument of the First Meditation and Descartes sees them as related by a certain informal movement of thought. The conclusion of the first plays no formal role in the second, and it is argued that despite some features of the Second Meditation persuasively discussed by Wilson, Descartes does not conflate them. It is shown how these different, but connected, arguments relate to a significant difference among certain classic reactions to Cartesian dualism — a difference that continues to resonate in present-day philosophy. The chapter ends by offering some considerations in favor of the most radical line of criticism considered.