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Deliberation and the First Person

David Owens

preprint DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1094443 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness, but rational control over belief does not require the I-concept, contrary to claims by Shoemaker and Burge.

Abstract

Philosophers like Shoemaker and Burge argue that only self-conscious creatures can exercise rational control over their mental lives. In particular they urge that reflective rationality requires possession of the I-concept, the first person concept. These philosophers maintain that rational creatures like ourselves can exercise reflective control over belief as well as action. I agree that we have this sort of control over our actions and that practical freedom presupposes self-consciousness. But I deny that anything like this is true of belief.