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Mathematizing phenomenology

Jeffrey Yoshimi

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences July 1, 2007 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-007-9052-4 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Edmund husserl Mathematization Dynamical systems theory Formalization Naturalism
Key points Argues that Husserl's apparent rejection of mathematics in phenomenology does not preclude his own use of mathematical methods, and demonstrates this through his use of dynamical systems concepts.

Abstract

Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper I focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical systems theory.

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