God, Mind, and Body: Part 2

The chapter argues that the mind-body problem is best understood by recognizing that consciousness is a direct experience and cannot be identical with a brain process. While mental processes may appear as brain processes when observed through instruments, the author contends that consciousness is reality and brain processes are its "shadow." The identity theory is dismissed as an old materialistic view in modern disguise. Behaviorists are criticized for mistaking side effects in the physical "shadow-world" for the essences of realities, compounding the error of materialism.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The chapter looks at the mind-body problem from a more reasonable point of view. Mental processes, whether conscious or unconscious, may be observed as brain processes or neural process. The new, somewhat more generalized, dogma thus becomes: the feelings of animals look as if they were brain processes whenever brain specialists observe these feelings through their instruments and their senses. Modern philosophy engendered several variations of this fallacious materialism. Consciousness cannot be identical with a brain-process because it is a direct experience. On the contrary, a brain-process is only in a certain way identical with consciousness. The author stated that consciousness observed though instruments and senses look like brain-processes. Consciousness is reality but brain-processes are its "shadow." The identity theory is an odd, old materialistic view in a modern disguise. Behaviorists mistake side effects in the physical shadow-world for essences of realities, and this serves only to compound the error.