On Witnessing - On Recording, and Being the One Who Records
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) June 26, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20923442 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cognitive reframing Subject documents Meaning existential Objectivity philosophy Monism Original meaning Philosophy of science Epistemology Mathematical proof Philosophy of technology Domain mathematical analysis Axiom |
| Key points | Proposes that the combination problem in philosophy of mind can be reframed as a question about redundant recording, making combination-failure a measurable degradation of redundant co-recording rather than a mystery. |
Abstract
On Witnessing takes Andrew Wiles's indirect proof of Fermat's Last Theorem as a method for approaching the combination problem in the philosophy of mind. Borrowing the structure of the Frey–Ribet–Wiles route — a reduction, a bridge, and a theorem proved in a far domain — the essay reframes the question of how micro-perspectives combine into a single unified subject as a question about redundant recording, drawing on the physics of objectivity (quantum Darwinism and environment-induced einselection). The double meaning of witnessing — to record and to undergo — is the essay's hinge. Its load-bearing posit, a perspectival dual-aspect monism that identifies recording and undergoing as one act under two descriptions, is declared openly rather than smuggled. The piece does not claim a proof. Instead it offers a meter: an operational reframing under which combination-failure — split-brain, dissociation, the grain problem — becomes a measurable degradation of redundant co-recording rather than a mystery. The seam between philosophical framework and empirical claim is kept deliberately visible throughout, in keeping with the series' standing commitment.