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On Witnessing - On Recording, and Being the One Who Records

Jamison Johsnon

PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) June 26, 2026 DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.20923442 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Cognitive reframing Subject documents Meaning existential Objectivity philosophy Monism Original meaning Philosophy of science Epistemology Mathematical proof Philosophy of technology Domain mathematical analysis Axiom
Key points Proposes that the combination problem in philosophy of mind can be reframed as a question about redundant recording, making combination-failure a measurable degradation of redundant co-recording rather than a mystery.

Abstract

On Witnessing takes Andrew Wiles's indirect proof of Fermat's Last Theorem as a method for approaching the combination problem in the philosophy of mind. Borrowing the structure of the Frey–Ribet–Wiles route — a reduction, a bridge, and a theorem proved in a far domain — the essay reframes the question of how micro-perspectives combine into a single unified subject as a question about redundant recording, drawing on the physics of objectivity (quantum Darwinism and environment-induced einselection). The double meaning of witnessing — to record and to undergo — is the essay's hinge. Its load-bearing posit, a perspectival dual-aspect monism that identifies recording and undergoing as one act under two descriptions, is declared openly rather than smuggled. The piece does not claim a proof. Instead it offers a meter: an operational reframing under which combination-failure — split-brain, dissociation, the grain problem — becomes a measurable degradation of redundant co-recording rather than a mystery. The seam between philosophical framework and empirical claim is kept deliberately visible throughout, in keeping with the series' standing commitment.