Animal consciousness and phenomenal concepts

The essay argues that phenomenal concept theorists—who hold that concepts of conscious experience are acquired only through firsthand experience—cannot determine which non-human animal species are phenomenally conscious. Because these theorists prohibit any a priori link between phenomenal and non-phenomenal concepts, standard methods such as neuro-identity theory, behaviorism, functionalism, inference to the best explanation, analogical inference, similarity inference, and inference by prototype all fail to establish animal consciousness. The author contends that the very framework of phenomenal concepts makes cross-species attribution of consciousness impossible.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT A phenomenal concept is a concept that one possesses only if one has the relevant experience. In this essay, I argue that phenomenal concept theorists, namely, those who believe that we acquire phenomenal concepts through being acquainted with the relevant experience, can never succeed in determining which species of non-human animals are phenomenally conscious because they prohibit any a priori correlation between phenomenal and non-phenomenal concepts. I make my argument by first discussing several ways in which a phenomenal concept theorist may explain which animal species are conscious, namely, with neuro-identity theory, behaviorism, and functionalism, and the problem that these approaches entail. I then illustrate how the alternative approaches of scientific inference to the best explanation, analogical inference, similarity inference, and inference by prototype face the same problem.