Comprehension of the consciousness – brain problem within the framework of materialist ontology

The article examines philosophical approaches to the mind-brain problem, focusing on how mental and physical phenomena relate within materialist ontology. Using reductive theories such as identity theory and functionalism, the author identifies difficulties in explaining non-physical mental phenomena as purely physical. The author contends that non-reductive materialism, particularly the concept of "secondary duality properties," preserves the uniqueness of mental phenomena without contradicting materialism. The information approach, framed as secondary duality properties, is proposed as the most promising direction for constructing a theory of consciousness within materialist ontology.

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Abstract

The article considers the main approaches to the issues of the correlation of mental-psychic and material-physical within the framework of the problem of consciousness-brain. Attention is emphasized on the comprehension of mental phenomena from the point of view of materialistic ontology. The author, using the example of reductive theories of consciousness (identity theory, functionalism), reveals a number of difficulties that arise when trying to explain non-physical (mental) phenomena in the form of physical being. It is emphasized that the understanding of mental-psychic phenomena within the framework of non-reductive materialism (primary and secondary duality properties) preserves the uniqueness of the mental and does not contradict materialist ontology. The author's consideration of the consciousness-brain problem from the point of view of the information approach in the form of secondary duality properties seems to be the most promising direction for the construction of a theory of consciousness within the framework of materialist ontology.